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Abstract – Public management reforms of the last decades increased the competition between 
the public and the private sector and challenged formerly standardised and collective public 
personnel policies. Based on expert interviews, this paper explores the impact of competition 
on public personnel policies in comparative case studies. We distinguish between competition 
for the provision of services, evidenced in waste collection, and competition for highly quali-
fied personnel, exemplified by energy regulatory agencies. These cases are contrasted with the 
police as a field which is not influenced by either form of competition. Comparing Germany, 
France, the UK, and Sweden we show how competition shapes public personnel policies in 
different institutional settings. The results indicate that the designs of personnel policies in 
different fields of public employment are influenced by the type and the extent of competition. 
Nevertheless, reactions to competition comply with the constraints and options of the respec-
tive national institutional design. 
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Wettbewerb die Personalpolitik öffentlicher Arbeitgeber beeinflusst 
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1. Introduction 
In many OECD-countries, public employment traditionally was subject to unitary 
regulation and was characterised by standardised personnel policies. Based on the 
New Public Management (NPM) paradigm (Hood 1991; Christensen/Laegreid 2003; 
OECD 2004), the public sector reforms of the last decades not only questioned the 
state as the main producer, provider and distributor of services, but also the traditional 
practices of public human resources management (Page/Wright 2007). While gener-
ally public sector reforms aimed both at enhancing the efficiency and at improving the 
quality of public services, in the context of the financial crisis recent measures are 
primarily geared towards reducing costs as the substantial recruitment freeze in the 
British civil service exemplifies (The Telegraph 25 May 2010). 
The NPM-oriented reforms resulted in increasing competition between the public 
and the private sector in two different aspects: First, the transfer of tasks and respon-
sibilities to private actors led to new managerial functions of the state 
(Genschel/Zangl 2008) and increased the necessity for public personnel with specific 
skills also demanded in the private sector. Since the labour market supply of specialists 
tends to be smaller than the demand, states are facing increasing competition with the 
private sector for personnel (OECD 2001). This kind of competition is not new, but it 
is intensifying due to the increase in high profile public sector jobs and the demo-
graphic change in many European countries. Second, liberalisation and privatisation 
led to competition for the provision of services between public and private organisa-
tions (Atzmüller/Hermann 2004; Brandt/Schulten 2008; Ferlie et al. 1996; Lippert 
2005). As in the personnel-intensive service industry the design of personnel policies 
is a central factor for competitiveness, this might lead to an adaptation to private em-
ployment standards. 
Although these developments suggest an increasing diversity between public sec-
tor fields, research so far focused on personnel policies of the public sector as a whole 
(Farnham et al. 1996; Raadschelders et al. 2007) or on single levels or organisations of 
the public sector (Kuhlmann/Bogumil 2007; Bouckaert 2006). Different develop-
ments across the public sector have so far been neglected. Thus, this paper investi-
gates the divergence within national public sectors by assessing how different forms of 
competition result in differences of current personnel policies in the fields of the po-
lice, of energy regulatory agencies, and of municipal waste collection. Since responses 
to competition in terms of personnel policies are likely to differ according to national 
traditions of public employment and reform agendas (Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004) we also 
provide a country comparison of France, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Concerning 
the interplay between competition and public personnel policies we assume that dif-
ferent forms of competition affect the personnel policies of different fields of public 
employment in distinct ways. This might induce similarities between the personnel 
policies of these fields across countries. However, we also assume that national institu-
tional patterns of public personnel policies serve as a filter for competition. Based 
mainly on expert interviews with human resources managers, the paper presents and 
compares findings on the impact of competition on recruitment, initial and continual 
training, career advancement, pay systems and job security.  
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In the next section (2) we illustrate our research design and discuss analytical 
considerations. The core of the paper is then composed of case studies of public 
sector fields that show how competition influences personnel policies in practice (3-5). 
The synopsis condenses the findings and emphasises that institutionalist arguments 
can explain general national characteristics of public personnel policies while 
functionalist arguments can account for similarities of personnel policies in particular 
fields of public employment across countries and thus for differences between 
personnel policies within a country (6).  
2. Research design and analytical considerations 
In order to detect the impact of competition on public personnel policies and to ac-
count for institutional contexts at the same time, this paper is based on cross-country 
case studies of the police, of municipal waste collection authorities and of energy regu-
latory agencies. The paper takes a broad understanding of competition as the striving 
of at least two actors for the same objective, whereby the achievement of one actor 
reduces the chances for the achievement of the other actor (Nullmeier 2005: 108). 
With regard to the relations between the public and the private sector, two different 
fields of competition are distinguished: competition for personnel and competition for 
the provision of services. While energy regulatory agencies are supposed to compete 
with private firms for highly-qualified personnel, municipal waste disposal represents 
competition for the provision of services. The police, in contrast, are assumed to be a 
field of the public sector that faces no such competition with the private sector. 
The analysis of the impact of competition on public personnel policies can build 
on the structural-functionalist approach of social systems as developed by Talcott 
Parsons (Parsons 1951; Parsons et al. 1953). In his AGIL-scheme, the basic concept 
of his general analysis of social systems, Parsons identifies adaptation (A), goal attain-
ment (G), integration (I), and management of latent problems (L) as “survival prob-
lems“ of social systems and organisations respectively. Although being criticised for 
the vagueness and lack of empirical testability of his approach (Silverman 1971: 54ff; 
Whyte 1961), by transferring his general concepts to the analysis of organisations 
(Parsons 1956a, Parsons 1956b), Parsons has been able to direct the attention to “the 
influence on the internal structure of organizations of (a) the environment within 
which it operates and (b) the nature of its goal and that it has a goal to fulfil” 
(Landsberger 1961: 236). In this regard Landsberger identifies an unstated underlying 
hypothesis of Parsons, namely that “organizations will veer between efficiency (A and 
G) on the one hand, and the stability and possible drag on efficiency signified by hav-
ing a well integrated organization with articulated values (I and L) on the other“ 
(Landsberger 1961: 234).  
From this perspective, the public sector traditionally fulfilled a dual function. 
First, it provided citizens with goods and services that were not or could not be pro-
vided by the private sector. Secondly, from a labour market perspective the public 
sector constituted a protected internal labour market (Sengenberger 1987; Doeringer/ 
Piore 1971) and had an integrative function for groups that were disadvantaged in the 
private sector. Until the 1980s these two functions were complementary and stabilised 
each other as the expansion of the welfare states required employees to produce and 
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distribute public goods and services. Those who so far had been disadvantaged in the 
private sector could be integrated into the labour market in this way (Gottschall 
2009).1 However, public sector reforms and especially the resulting competitive pres-
sures are likely to disturb the equilibrium between these two functions of the public 
sector.  
In our analysis, efficiency is understood as the ability of a public sector field to 
adapt to competitive pressures in order to be able to fulfil its task. Competition is 
regarded as an external factor to which the different fields of the public sector with 
their specific tasks have to adapt their personnel policies. This is because personnel 
policies contribute essentially to an efficient task fulfilment. For instance, an energy 
regulatory agency will not be able to fulfil its complex task if it is not able to recruit 
and retain the required highly qualified staff because the potential employees rather 
tend to work in the private sector due to higher wages. On the other hand, public 
organisations with high personnel costs will not be able to compete with the private 
sector for the provision of waste collection. However, we also value the idea of func-
tional equivalents (Scherer 2003: 328) as alternative organisational solutions that can 
meet functional requirements in the same way as, e.g., financial flexibility. In this con-
text we assume that specific functional equivalents are a result of different national 
institutional contexts. We consider functionalist considerations to be of explanatory 
value with regard to cross-national similarities of personnel policies between particular 
public sector fields. Moreover, functionalist theory can account for differences be-
tween public personnel policies within one country. More precisely, we assume that 
competition for personnel or for the provision of services evokes adaptations to private sector personnel 
policies (assumption 1). Thus, we focus on efficiency and do not systematically elaborate 
on the integrative function of the different public sector fields.  
However, public personnel policies are closely related to public administration re-
gimes (Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004; Tepe et al. 2010). The impact of competition on public 
employment in waste collection, energy regulatory agencies and the police is thus lim-
ited by institutional factors. Our notion of institutions is based on the conceptualisa-
tion presented by Scott (2001), who distinguishes between three pillars of institutions: 
a regulative pillar, denoting regulative rules such as laws and sanctions enforced 
through coercion, e.g. provisions on employment status, recruitment procedures, or 
pay systems that enable or hinder the state to adapt personnel policies; a normative 
pillar, referring to binding expectations that are based on social norms and are exem-
plified, for instance, by specific public sector job definitions or professional roles; and 
a cultural-cognitive pillar which stresses the socially mediated construction of a com-
mon framework of meaning, such as a shared public service ethos.2 
                                                          
1  Empirically, this is especially evident for women whose share in the public sectors of 
most Western European countries rose above 50% after the year 2000 (OECD 2002a: 
20).  
2  The construction of this institutional framework of public personnel policies is strongly 
influenced by public sector trade unions. These tend to be more powerful than private 
sector unions despite nationally different patterns and strengths of public sector employee 
representation (Bordogna 2008; Keller 2010 for an account of the German case). 
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Institutionalist theory helps to understand why there are nationally distinct an-
swers to competition even within the same fields of the public sector. Although in-
creasing competition with the private economy must be dealt with to different degrees 
in different fields of the public sector, it is unlikely that national characteristics of 
public personnel policies are suspended due to the emergence of competition. We 
rather expect competition to be transformed into solutions that are in line with na-
tional patterns of public personnel policies. This means that the form and degree of adapta-
tions towards private sector personnel policies depend on the flexibility of the institutional framework 
of public personnel policies (assumption two). 
The countries of comparison differ significantly with regard to public employ-
ment (Hils/Streb 2010). In the UK, the majority of public employees is subject to 
regular labour law and has the same legal employment status as private sector employ-
ees. Public employment in general was deeply transformed through partly radical re-
forms in the 1980s and 1990s. Results of this process are de-standardised personnel 
policies that strongly vary between different public employers. In Germany and France 
hierarchical and standardised structures of recruitment and career development char-
acterise public employment. In the German case, public employment is decentralised 
and characterised by a dualism of civil servants (37%, Statistisches Bundesamt 2010: 
Table 2.1) with unilateral statutory employment regulation on the one hand and public 
employment on the basis of collective agreements on the other hand. Public employ-
ment in France, in contrast, is legally regulated on the national level and a larger share 
of the public workforce has the status of civil servants (84%, Direction générale de 
l’administration et de la fonction publique 2009: 10). As in the German civil service, 
the main characteristics are employment for lifetime, formalised entrance to the civil 
service followed by seniority based career advancement, and a pay system oriented at 
securing a certain status for civil servants and their families (Hils/Streb 2010: 28). In 
contrast to Germany and France, public employment in Sweden underwent encompass-
ing reforms and is nowadays aligned with employment in the private sector.  
In comparative perspective public personnel policies still differ significantly from 
human resources management in the private sector. In a conceptualisation of person-
nel policies, we distinguish career-based policies as in Weber’s model of bureaucracy 
from position-based policies (Bach/Della Rocca 2000: 83f; Hils/Streb 2010: 8; 
Knill/Balint 2007: 437). Position-based personnel policies are adjusted to a tight cou-
pling of specific tasks and jobs. Recruitment procedures and training tend to be non-
standardised and focus on the requirements of the position to be filled, while upward 
career development is based on performance. Career-based personnel policies, in con-
trast, are based on the notion of life-long careers within the organisation and provide 
standardised paths for recruitment, training and continuous upward career develop-
ment. Whereas personnel policies in the private sector tend to be rather position-
based (with the exception of very large enterprises), many public employment rela-
tionships and especially civil servant relationships are characterised by career-based 
personnel policies.  
The following case studies concentrate on job security as well as on recruitment, 
initial and continual training, patterns of career advancement and pay systems as main 
criteria of human resources management (Knill/Balint 2007: 436). Results are based 
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on 38 expert interviews with human resource managers and personnel or trade union 
representatives in the police, municipal waste collection, and energy regulatory agen-
cies in the UK, Germany, France and Sweden. Furthermore, codified regulations 
(such as laws) and publications of different public authorities (such as annual reports 
of energy regulatory agencies) were analysed. Finally we include insights from existing 
empirical research on the terms and conditions of public employment in the different 
fields.  
3. The police 
Police forces increased during the last two decades in contrast to other parts of the 
public sectors in Britain, France, Germany and Sweden (Kroos 2010: 2, 7; cf. for data: 
Hicks 2005: 483; INSEE 2009; Statistisches Bundesamt 2009; Rikspolisstyrelsen 
2010). In all advanced democracies police governance, including personnel policies, is 
high on the political agenda (Bull 2000; Ivarsson Westerberg 2004; Renaudie 1999). 
The police render a key service to society (Horton 1995: 1) and therefore belong to 
the heart of public services. In protecting the society’s rules and values, police officers 
act as the long arm of the constitutional state (Lange/Schenck 2004; Monjardet 2001). 
Due to this positioning in the state’s centre, competition for the provision of services 
does not affect this field of the public sector. The provision of public security is a 
direct task of the state and cannot be delegated to private providers. Accordingly, 
private security services mainly provide security for private clients, events or buildings 
(Koltermann 2006; Lange/Schenck 2004: 103). The particularity of the police’s mis-
sion also gives rise to the assumption that the police do not have to compete for per-
sonnel, as they offer a unique job profile and work ethos not found elsewhere.3  
Indeed, all interview partners reported that due to high popularity and profes-
sional singularity, the police can choose from a large pool of applicants. Only in Ger-
many, in contrast to what we expected, competition for talented personnel plays out 
to some extent. The German Länder, having the main responsibility for the police and 
employing the bulk of police officers, perceive an increasing degree of competition for 
personnel, but not with the private sector. In fact, the Länder compete for personnel 
among each other, i.e. there is competition within the public service. Due to the de-
creasing size of school leaver cohorts police recruitment officers are now more and 
more concerned about what can be offered to future applicants in terms of career 
prospects. Respective reforms were at least to some degree linked to the perception of 
competition: While some Länder decided to abolish the lowest career bracket for 
newly recruited police officers, other Länder tried to ease upward mobility by reform-
ing entry examinations for higher career brackets or by reducing qualifying periods for 
promotions. Increased competition for police personnel is also reflected in growing 
efforts to recruit both women and members of ethnic minorities; however, this devel-
opment is also linked to the organisational goal of integration in the sense of Parson’s 
AGIL-scheme. Our interviewees, though, also referred to the different national policy 
                                                          
3  Furthermore, a high degree of unionisation among police officers and a pronounced 
professional identity based on unitary training pathways and on the risks involved in eve-
ryday policing open up only small room for personnel reforms.  
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traditions in this respect: In France, not only positive discrimination but also positive 
action for under-represented groups in the police force is discarded in favour of the 
principle of equality of opportunity. Both the British and the Swedish police forces are 
characterised by comprehensive sets of equal opportunity policies, mainly by means of 
positive action or by efforts to increase transparency of personnel decisions. The 
German case is somewhat peculiar insofar as efforts to recruit ethnic minority officers 
already exist since the mid-1990s, albeit with rather small success, while positive action 
towards women is considered as unnecessary despite the late admission of women to 
the Western German police forces. 
Generally, patterns of career development as well as pay structures within the po-
lice remain in line with the career-based civil service model. In all four countries of 
comparison, employment regulation in the police allows for little flexibility. At the 
same time, police officers benefit from favourable employment conditions in all coun-
tries, first and foremost a lifelong employment guarantee. Entry into the police force 
is usually linked to a general beginner’s position or an entry position in the career 
bracket that corresponds to one’s level of general education. Subsequent career devel-
opment then follows a stable path and is at least to some degree linked to seniority, 
while pay development is almost completely dependent on seniority, and perform-
ance-related pay rarely exists. Police employment in the UK and Sweden diverts 
slightly from this picture of the classic civil servant career: In the UK, statutory em-
ployment regulation for regular police officers has remained more or less untouched, 
but since 2002 a second-class group of policemen has been established. An increasing 
number of civil police staff fulfilling policing tasks are subject to diverse and far less 
advantageous employment conditions (Jones/Sluis 2009; Loveday et al. 2008; HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary 2004). Personnel policies within the Swedish police al-
low for a more flexible consideration of the organisation’s requirements, making them 
less similar to the almost purely career-based policies in Germany or France. In Swe-
den the important glass-ceiling-reform of 1997 partly abolished standardised promotion 
paths, and pay structures allow for individual pay setting within a given framework for 
those in higher positions. 
Police personnel policies follow sector-specific needs and institutionally pre-
defined public sector logics across the four countries of comparison. This absence of 
competition in combination with forceful national public employment traditions 
strongly influences police personnel policies: In Sweden, for instance, the advanta-
geous position of police officers as compared to other Swedish public sector employ-
ees can at least partly be explained by the fact that in the police “you do not have the 
same pressure from outside. You do not have a market” (Swedish police HR man-
ager). This certainly also applies to German and French police forces, where organisa-
tional reform and new personnel policies can be understood from a functionalist point 
of view and are linked to cost-efficiency and the need to improve overall police per-
formance. Likewise, in contrast to many other British public organisations that are 
forced to compete for the provision of public services through various public sector 
reforms, British police in England and Wales face no competition. This is probably 
one reason for the almost untouched statutory employment regulation that applies to 
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warranted police officers,4 while increasing use of civil staff allows for cost contain-
ment. The slight influence of competition for talented personnel within the German 
public sector supports our assumption that it is the field-specific coincidence of insti-
tutionalised public employment characteristics and competition structures that steers 
public personnel policies. 
4. Energy regulatory agencies 
The OECD-wide liberalisation and privatisation policies since the 1980s led to a trans-
formation from a state that produced, organised and distributed all kinds of services 
to a regulatory state (Majone 1994, 1997; Moran 2002). The most important institutional 
innovation of this transformation was the establishment of independent regulatory 
agencies (IRAs). Although showing country-specific particularities that result from 
different organisational cultures, legal frameworks, and political systems (OECD 
2002b), agencies share some general characteristics: They are formally separated from 
the ministry; carry out public tasks at the national level on a permanent basis; are 
staffed with public servants; are financed mainly by state budget; and have (different 
degrees of) autonomy from their ministry in policy decision making and over person-
nel, finance and managerial matters (Christensen/Lægreid 2006: 12). Being a subgroup 
of central agencies, these characteristics also apply to IRAs. They are empowered with 
the task of regulating certain aspects of an industry in order to ensure competition and 
to protect consumers, for example, by the regulation of network access, pricing, and 
end user tariffs (International Energy Agency 2001: 14). This novel public task of 
creating and maintaining competition in a technically highly complex sector is very 
demanding. In contrast to the traditional state-owned monopoly which minimised the 
need for specialist regulatory expertise, in the new regulatory state “effective regula-
tion in electricity requires not just substantial numbers of staff, it requires substantial 
numbers of staff with particular and scarce specialist skills e.g. economists, lawyers, ac-
countants, financial analysts as well as engineers” (Stern 2000: 136). Thus, the com-
plexity of these tasks is supposed to have a strong impact on the agencies’ HR man-
agement, because for IRAs “ensuring the competence and specialisation of staff is 
particularly important” (International Energy Agency 2001: 28). 
With the Utilities Act of 2000 the formerly separated British gas and electricity 
regulators were merged into the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). Ofgem’s 
personnel policy is subject to the Civil Service Management Code which sets out the regu-
lations and instructions to departments and agencies regarding the terms and condi-
tions of employment for British civil servants. Within this framework the departments 
and agencies are highly flexible in designing their own personnel policies. 
The issue of competition for employees was considered as early as the establish-
ment of Ofgem. Pay was regarded as the most suitable instrument for being able to 
attract the required personnel: “[…] we had to design a pay-structure that could attract 
people from the private sector as well as the public sector, because if we’d had just the 
                                                          
4  The term “warranted police officer” in the UK refers to police officers who have the 
right to act as representative of the state, e.g. they can arrest someone in contrast to non-
warranted police staff. 
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constraints of the public sector, we wouldn’t have been able to attract the people we 
needed to do the job“ (Ofgem HR manager). This focus on pay reflects the general 
guidelines on the reward principles of the Civil Service, which state that “reward is 
one of the key tools that employers have to attract, retain and engage the optimal 
workforce to deliver high performance services to their customers” (Cabinet Office 
n.d.). Accordingly, in order to be able to recruit and retain staff from private compa-
nies, Her Majesty’s Treasury gave Ofgem some financial scope with regard to its pay 
structure.  
As a consequence, Ofgem was able to design a structure which seems to be com-
paratively competitive. Ofgem prefers employees which are early in their career but 
have already made some experiences in the private sector:5 Between 60 and 70 % of 
Ofgem’s approximately 340 employees come from the private sector, mainly lawyers, 
economists, and engineers. However, “there’s a certain level which is senior profes-
sional jobs where we struggle to attract people, partly because they are very attractive 
to the outside, industry and the private sector” (Ofgem HR manager). In order to deal 
with this problem, in 2006 Ofgem started a Graduate Development Programme with 
the main purpose of filling those jobs where Ofgem has difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining people. After having spent two years in the programme, the graduates should 
work for two more years on a middle professional level. Subsequently they are ready 
to move to a senior professional level. With regard to the competition for employees, 
this Graduate Development Programme can be interpreted as a functional equivalent 
to the higher wages of the private sector. 
The German Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) was established in 1998 
under the name Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Post (RegTP) as a higher 
federal authority within the scope of business of the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology (Federal Network Agency 2009: 192). Its status guarantees certain 
independence with regard to personnel, organisational and financial matters (Schmidt 
2005: 1027). 
In 2005 the RegTP was assigned new functions and renamed to Federal Agency 
for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway. Thus, in contrast to the 
British, French and Swedish case, the Bundesnetzagentur is a cross-sectoral regulatory 
agency. Additionally, apart from its regulatory tasks, the agency performs various 
other technical functions at the street-level. This variety of tasks is the reason for both 
the comparatively large size and a heterogeneous workforce consisting mainly of law-
yers, economists and engineers in the headquarters and technical staff in numerous 
regional offices. While about 2200 of the approximately 2500 employees have the 
status of civil servants, the rest of the workforce are public employees. 
The personnel policy is basically in line with the provisions of the German civil 
service law. Although the agency cannot compete with private sector wages, recruiting 
and retaining employees is not considered as a problem. About 70-80 % of the newly 
recruited employees are graduates. They possess key qualifications but have not ac-
                                                          
5  According to Ofgem’s HR Director there are three reasons for the private sector: First 
expertise, secondly the credibility of the employees when dealing with the industry, and 
finally their attitude to work.  
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quired special skills yet. The high share of job starters can be traced back to the fact 
that the Bundesnetzagentur wants to develop versatile employees because of its ever 
changing tasks. However, the recruitment of job starters is also a characteristic of 
career based systems with their focus on lifelong employment. Accordingly, very few 
of these employees leave the agency for a job in the private sector.  
The most important reason for the unproblematic competition can be seen in the 
high degree of identification the employees have with the agency and its public task: 
As early as the job interview the agency tries to sort out those applicants for whom 
monetary considerations seem to be most important and avoids hiring them. In con-
trast, apart from key qualifications, it is very important “if they suit us” (Bundes-
netzagentur HR manager). Additionally, the agency is generally sceptical towards per-
formance-related pay as an instrument for motivating employees. The high motivation 
of employees and their close identification with the agency can be mainly traced back 
to openness, flat hierarchies and the confidence the Bundesnetzagentur places in its 
young employees by assigning important tasks and far reaching competencies to them 
(cf. also Bertelsmann Stiftung 2004). 
The identification with the authority is further strengthened by the possibilities of 
internal career advancement. Due to the agency’s comparatively large size most vacant 
posts are advertised internally, thus giving the employees the opportunity to apply for 
better posts. In this context, the individual continual training policy aims at successful 
applications for higher positions inside the agency or the entrance into the next salary 
grade. This, again, is typical of career based systems.  
The French Commission de régulation de l’énergie (CRE) was established in 2000 and is 
responsible for the regulation of the electricity and natural gas market. CRE is a so 
called Autorité Administrative Indépentante (AAI). According to the definition of the Con-
seil d’État, AAIs are institutions that act 
“on behalf of the state without being subordinate to the government and enjoy, 
for the proper conduct of their assignments, guarantees which enable them to act in a 
fully autonomous fashion, such that there action may not be directed or censured 
except by the courts” (Conseil d’État 2001: 257, quoted in Rochet et al. 2002: 72). 
According to Jorion (1998: 42), AAIs are a “completely remarkable rupture with 
the Napoleonic conception of a hierarchical system where the administration is sub-
ject to the orders of the executive” (quoted in Elgie 2006: 215). As a consequence, the 
personnel policies of AAIs differ considerably from the traditional career based 
French civil service and are characterised by a high degree of independence especially 
with regard to matters of recruitment, pay systems, and continual training. An impor-
tant restriction to the AAIs’ flexibility is the fact that the government is responsible 
for the allocation of their budgetary posts and the budget of their wage bills.  
Like all AAIs, the CRE has the possibility to employ fonctionnaires (i.e. civil ser-
vants) from other authorities on secondment and agents contractuels with temporary 
contracts for three years which can be extended to six years. At the end of 2008, 14 % 
of the 129 employees were fonctionnaires, while 86 % were agents contractuels (Com-
mission de Régulation de l’Énergie 2008: 10).  Once working for CRE, both status 
groups are treated equally under the employment conditions designed by the agency. 
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Although the CRE is flexible in setting wages and uses individual performance re-
lated pay components, due to budgetary restrictions it cannot compete with private 
sector wages. As there are not enough fonctionnaires able to fulfil CRE’s special func-
tions, it is vital to recruit a large share of personnel especially with experience from the 
energy sector. In this context the competitive disadvantage with regard to pay is con-
sidered a serious problem. However, as more than 50 % of the approximately 130 
employees worked in private companies before joining the agency, it is obvious that 
the agency is able to compensate for this competitive disadvantage. 
The main reason for not having difficulties in recruiting specialists can be seen in 
the specific design of CRE’s training policy which basically aims at meeting three ob-
jectives: “develop specific skills required for regulation activities; improve personal 
efficiency (IT and foreign languages); support career plans, including acquisition of 
qualifications, linked to CRE’s activities“ (Commission de Régulation de l’Énergie 
2006: 115). Among those objectives the support of career plans plays a key role for 
being able to recruit the required personnel. CRE’s continual training policy is directly 
geared towards compensating lower wages by providing programmes which make the 
employees even more attractive for private companies than they are already. In the 
words of CRE’s HR director: “[…] as we can’t give them the same level of pay they 
would have in the companies where they have been appreciated before, we offer them 
instead a catalogue of continual training programs which respond to their personal 
expectations” (translation by authors). As a consequence, the employees accept a tem-
porary loss in pay while working at the CRE with the perspective of getting better 
positions in private companies after having finished their contracts. Thus, the tempo-
rary contracts with the agents contractuels in combination with this specific design of the 
continual training policy can be interpreted as a functional equivalent for the higher 
private sector wages. 
The Swedish Energimarknadsinspektionen (EI) was established as an independent 
agency in 2008. Before it was part of the still existing Energimyndigheten which has a 
broader scope of responsibilities (Energimarknadsinspektionen 2009: 10). Although 
the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications is in charge of its activities, 
like all central government agencies EI carries out its tasks and missions autono-
mously. This autonomous exercise of functions is accompanied by a decentralised 
personnel system in that “employer responsibilities have largely been delegated to the 
heads of the agencies” (Arbetsgivarverket 2009a: 7). 
EI is comparatively small, its headcount rose from 68 employees in January 2008 
(Energimarknadsinspektionen 2009: 9) to 91 employees at the end of 2009 
(Energimarknadsinspektionen 2010: 4). Like the regulatory agencies of the UK, 
France and Germany, its workforce mainly consists of lawyers, economists, and engi-
neers. About 50 % of its employees are recruited from the private sector and competi-
tion for personnel is not considered a problem. Accordingly, the personnel policy is 
not especially geared towards recruiting and retaining employees from the private 
sector but very similar to the personnel policies of other Swedish agencies. 
Based on central collective agreements, pay and other working conditions of cen-
tral government agencies are established in collective or individual agreements be-
tween employer and employees (Arbetsgivarverket 2009a: 13). Pay is individual, dif-
50  Daniela Kroos, Sebastian Streb, Sylvia Hils: Public Employment between Markets and Institutions 
 
ferentiated and based on three criteria: “a) level of responsibility and degree of diffi-
culty of the work, b) performance and contribution to the operation’s goals and c) the 
cost of equivalent labour on the labour market” (Arbetsgivarverket 2009b: 8). These 
criteria are relevant both for setting the wages of new employees and for the annual 
pay setting dialogue between line-managers and employees. Especially when setting 
wages for new employees the cost of equivalent work on the labour market plays a 
role. Thus, if absolutely essential to recruit a certain employee, EI uses its flexibility in 
setting wages in order to minimise existing wage differences with the private sector.   
This policy is a result of the gradual adaptation of the government’s pay and em-
ployment conditions towards the private sector since the late 1970s. As a consequence 
of the former centralised system of pay in the central government sector, less qualified 
positions were better paid and positions requiring higher qualifications worse paid 
than in the private sector. The dissatisfaction with this situation from agencies that 
competed with the private sector for labour was one important reason for the gradual 
erosion of the centralised system of pay and the delegation of negotiating responsibili-
ties to individual agencies (Andersson/Schager 1999: 246). The government’s Person-
nel Policy Bill from 1985 stated that “substantial wage differentials should be avoided 
as regards employees with similar work in different labour market sectors” (quoted in 
Swedish Ministry of Finance 1995: 20). 
Summing up, because of distinct institutional backgrounds the four analysed 
agencies perceive the competition for highly qualified employees differently. Accord-
ingly, competition has different effects on the personnel policies. The CRE has a spe-
cial administrative status which allows for a personnel policy that stands in sharp con-
trast to the still dominant career based system of the French civil service; the competi-
tive disadvantage in pay constitutes a problem and is compensated with a specific 
continual training policy. Ofgem’s personnel policy is subject to the flexible civil ser-
vice framework which is geared towards the adaptation of personnel policies accord-
ing to different business needs of departments and agencies. Thus Ofgem is relatively 
competitive with regard to pay; at least as long as the employees are in the early stages 
of their careers. EI in turn fits well into the overall flexible employment conditions of 
the Swedish central government agencies which are close to the conditions of the 
private labour market. As a consequence, EIs personnel policy is not especially influ-
enced by competition for personnel. Finally, the German Bundesnetzagentur does not 
consider itself to be in competition with the private sector at all. While its personnel 
policy still shows central characteristics of the traditional German career based system, 
the agency has been able to develop an organisational culture which creates a high 
identification of the workforce with its employer. Accordingly, the private sector does 
not seem to be a serious alternative for those employed in the Bundesnetzagentur. 
5. Municipal waste collection 
In contrast to police tasks and energy regulation, waste collection is not solely pro-
vided by the state. Municipalities are legally obliged to guarantee the service but they 
do not have to provide it via public utilities. Nevertheless, until the 1980s in most 
European states waste collection was mainly accomplished through public companies. 
Liberalisation and privatisation policies of the last decades led to an increased share of 
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private companies in this field and thereby to competition between public and private 
companies.  
Two forms of competition for the provision of this service can be distinguished. 
First, if contracts are awarded after competitive bidding, direct competition between 
both sectors exists as is mainly the case in the UK and for packaging waste in Ger-
many. Secondly, public provision can be based on a political decision, in which case 
public utilities are not in direct competition for the provision of the service, but the 
political decision for public service delivery has to be justified. Benchmarking and cost 
comparisons within the public sector or between public and private companies are 
means of legitimisation and can be interpreted as virtual competition (Nullmeier 2005: 
111). Due to liberalisation and privatisation of public services and austerity on the 
municipal level, this indirect competition for service provision has increased in the last 
decades (Hemmer et al. 2003: 6ff.).  
Despite new technical standards that make work much easier, waste collection 
remains personnel intensive with a large share of manual labour (European 
Commission 2001: 19). Except for a few technical or coordinative professions, jobs 
are dominated by drivers and other manual occupations (ibid.: 24) that do not require 
specific qualifications. In all countries waste collection is reported to be a field with a 
substantive share of employees being members of ethnic minorities. However, this is 
to a lesser extent the result of integrative policies but was rather a result of low labour 
supply. Nowadays against the background of high unemployment rates, in all coun-
tries labour supply is high and thus competition for employees is reported to be irrele-
vant. Contrastingly, high labour supply results in a better educational or vocational 
background amongst applicants.  
In all countries, the workforce is to a large degree male dominated; recruitment of 
women is limited by the low number of applications by women. Furthermore, human 
resources managers have different attitudes with regard to a gender-mixed workforce. 
Swedish human resources managers were the only ones to report that women work in 
waste collection and that the company strives to increase their share. This mirrors the 
national institutional background considering equal participation and gender equality 
as “a cornerstone of Swedish society” (Swedish Institute 2009: 1). Equal pay is not 
only an important aspect of equal treatment but employers also have to survey and 
analyse pay differentials and “to determine whether these are objectively based and 
have no connection with gender” (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen 2009: 11). Since 
pay in the male dominated waste collection sector is reported to be higher than in 
female dominated jobs that demand similar qualifications, human resources managers 
regard efforts to increase the share of women as a way to counteract pay differentials.  
In the United Kingdom competition for the provision of waste collection was not 
relevant until the end of the 1970s. Like many other public services, waste collection 
was solely provided by the state through the so-called Direct Service Organisations 
and Direct Labour Organisations (DSOs and DLOs). As in other fields of the public 
sector, employment in the waste collection was traditionally characterised by high job 
security, centralised pay structures and collective agreements on the national level. 
Encompassing reforms under the Thatcher Government changed this situation radi-
cally. The Local Government Act of 1988 introduced Compulsory Competitive Ten-
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dering (CCT) and thereby obliged DSOs to prove their competitiveness with the pri-
vate sector in terms of costs (Domberger/Jensen 1997). Although a large share of 
municipal organisations won tendering for waste collection (more than 70 %, 
Szymanski 1996: 7f.), CCT resulted in organisational transformations and a change in 
personnel policies. Employment security decreased significantly since cost reductions 
were above all realised through layoffs and a large number of employees lost their jobs 
(Szymanski 1996; Kerr/Radford 1994: 39). Furthermore, insecure employment as 
fixed-term employment or temporary agency work increased (Income Data Services 
2003: 82). As a result, a diversification of public employment with differing contracts 
within the municipalities can be observed. Since collective agreements on the national 
level are no longer binding, pay differs considerably between regions (ibid: 39f.).  
New Labour abolished CCT, but the new principle of “Best Value” that was set 
in the Local Government Act of 1999 did not lead to substantial changes. Even 
though competition with the private sector is no longer compulsory, it is still a main 
element of public service organisation (Higgins et al. 2005; Segalla 2006; Sachdev 
2001).  
Waste collection in Germany is characterised by a divided responsibility for 
household and packaging waste that is based on different regulations in regard to 
competition. In the household waste collection for which municipalities are responsi-
ble, tendering is not relevant in case of self-provision. Nevertheless the public utilities 
face indirect competition with the private sector. In the field of packaging waste the 
implementation of a new regulation in 1991 shifted the responsibility for packaging 
waste collection to the private sector. As a result, contracts in this field are only 
awarded after competitive bidding. While the public share in the household waste 
collection is about 50%, only about 10% of the packaging waste collection is provided 
by public utilities. The latter are mostly subsidiary firms of municipal companies that 
collect household waste (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 2007: 6).  
Major differences of personnel policies can be traced back to the form of com-
petitive threat: Employment in all municipal companies in the household waste collec-
tion is in general based on the regulation of the collective agreement for the public 
sector (Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst, TVöD). Accordingly, personnel poli-
cies are characterised by high employment security and comparatively good pay with 
career-based elements of progression.  
Employment in the packaging waste collection is, however, less favourable. Since 
contracts for the collection of packaging waste are temporary, employment is often 
only secured for the contracted period. In order to reduce costs and to keep up with 
their competitors, public companies ensure numerical flexibility by fixed-term con-
tracts or temporary agency work. Furthermore pay is generally lower in packaging 
waste than in household waste collection.  
However, pay and employment security not only differ between household waste 
and packaging waste collection, but also between the workers who were employed 
before and after the introduction of the TVöD in 2005: Workforce that was employed 
before the introduction of the TVöD is entitled to pay supplements that have been 
abolished with the introduction of the TVöD. In a case where privatisation of waste 
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collection was under discussion, new workforce was only employed on a fixed-term 
basis.  
Unlike in Germany, French packaging regulation did not lead to a dual structure 
and municipalities determine the degree of market involvement and competition by 
deciding over self-provision or contracting with private companies. About half of the 
waste collection is carried out by public organisations (ADEME 2009: 8). Virtual 
competition is of importance, especially in bigger cities where waste collection is often 
provided both by public and private companies based on a regional subdivision. Nev-
ertheless, the influence of competition on personnel policies is very restricted. French 
employees in municipal waste collection have civil servant status and belong to the 
Fonction publique territoriale with encompassing legal regulation. Employment is career-
based with a tenure contract, seniority-based salary and additional non-work supple-
ments. A distinctive feature of waste collection in contrast to the rest of the public 
sector is the early pension age of 55 years. Contrary to the other countries, encom-
passing career development exists and is regulated by law. Due to the fact that em-
ployment regulation is set on the national level, only minor differences in the person-
nel policies between municipalities can be found. 
Even though prices in the private sector decreased in the last years and brought 
costly public provision under scrutiny, consequences for the share of public provision 
or personnel policies are rare. The rigid employment regulation as well as avoidance of 
conflicts with the strong unions in this sector can be considered as important reasons. 
However, municipalities also use the subdivision between public and private service 
provision as a means to strengthen the position of the public employer against the 
unions. 
Municipal waste collection in Sweden decreased in the last decades and is the 
lowest of the four countries. Only about 25 % (Avfall Sverige 2007) of Swedish mu-
nicipalities provide their own waste collection. One reason for the lower share of pub-
lic service provision might be seen in employment contracts that are much more flexi-
ble than in the other countries: As in all other parts of the public sector, dismissal is 
generally possible. Thus organisational change is easier. Competition with the private 
sector for service provision is seen as an important topic but, in contrast to the other 
countries, the price of the service provision is less relevant than its quality:  
“It’s not running after bins. But it’s to be polite with the citizens to make a nice work. Go 
nice and slow in the traffic, don’t rush, follow traffic rules” (Swedish municipality HR 
manager). 
The quality-orientation impacts on personnel policies, and it is one reason for the 
abolition of a former work organisation that allowed the employees to go home after 
having completed the collection route for the day. The quality of service is also linked 
to high employment quality with encompassing programmes for further training. 
Summing up, competition for service provision has very different effects on em-
ployment in waste collection in the four countries. In the UK, the newly established 
private sector in the household waste collection led to a two-tier workforce and to 
reduced pay and employment security standards in the public sector, while the institu-
tional background in France constitutes a hindrance to competitive threats. In Ger-
many, public employment is differently affected depending on the form of competi-
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tion. Direct competition in the packaging waste collection led to reduced work secu-
rity and salaries; virtual competition in the household waste collection contributed to a 
broad variety of employment regulation. Compared to the other countries, municipali-
ties in Sweden are less active in waste collection, and job security is lowest by collec-
tive agreement. Nevertheless competition threatens personnel policies to a lesser de-
gree than in Germany.  
6. The interplay of competition and institutional settings: Synopsis and 
conclusions 
As we have shown in our case studies, competition for personnel or the provision of 
services affects the various fields of the public sector in different ways. In general, 
competition for the provision of services is almost irrelevant in the case of the police. 
In the police forces of the German Länder, competition for personnel influences deci-
sions on patterns of career development to a small extent, and it also seems to influ-
ence recruitment policies towards women and ethnic minorities. In France and Swe-
den, however, police personnel policies are not affected by competition at all. Among 
the three analysed public sector fields, police employment complies most strongly 
with career-based personnel policies, and personnel policies are rather inflexible. This 
observation, though, applies to a larger degree to police forces in Germany and France 
and to warranted police officers in the UK than to the Swedish police.  
Personnel policies in energy regulatory agencies on the other hand are clearly in-
fluenced by competition for highly qualified personnel. The British energy regulatory 
agency considers competitive pay as the most important means to recruit personnel, 
but despite the flexible framework of the Civil Service this is only possible when em-
ployees are in early phases of their careers. Therefore, difficulties in attracting qualified 
personnel for senior positions are counteracted with the uncommon step of launching 
an internal graduate programme. The French energy regulatory agency runs a person-
nel policy that is characteristic for French independent government agencies and is 
much more flexible than the typical French fonction publique. It attracts employees with 
the possibility to acquire experience highly valued by private employers on the energy 
market and by providing continual training that is oriented towards the future career 
development of the personnel. The Swedish energy regulatory agency, however, is 
embedded in a public sector environment that can hardly be distinguished from the 
flexible labour market conditions of the private economy. Therefore, competition 
with private employers is not considered as problematic; nevertheless, the agency 
makes use of its freedom with regard to salary setting when highly qualified personnel 
can only be won with high pay. In the German case, in contrast, qualified personnel 
can be recruited because of the flexible appearance of the civil service employment 
model combined with the promise of politically and publicly relevant tasks leading to a 
high degree of identification with the employer.  
In municipal waste collection, competition for the provision of services proves to 
be highly relevant with regard to personnel policies. The introduction of compulsory 
competitive tendering in British waste collection caused job losses, an increase of non-
standard employment and the deterioration of employment conditions in public em-
ployment. Likewise, in German municipalities which stand in direct competition with 
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private providers, both pay and job security decreased significantly. However, in Swe-
den, where waste collection is far less often carried out by public employers than in 
Germany, municipalities who commit themselves to this task do so in order to ensure 
a high quality of service as well as of employment conditions. French municipal waste 
collection is hardly affected by competition although the country has a strong mix of 
both public and private providers. This is due to the civil servant status of the em-
ployees. 
This last observation clearly underlines that not only competition structures but 
also national public sector employment models are crucial influential factors for per-
sonnel policies in particular fields of the public sector: In the British public sector, the 
introduction of flexible forms of human resources management was an element of the 
radical reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Nowadays this flexibility is mirrored in a large 
diversity of employment forms and personnel policies in the public sector. The dual 
employment structure within the German public sector leads to substantial employ-
ment differences between public employees in waste collection on the one hand and 
civil servants in the police or the Bundesnetzagentur on the other hand. In the French 
public sector, the high overall significance and standardisation of civil servant em-
ployment accounts for similarities between personnel policies within the police and in 
municipal waste collection. The Swedish case is characterised by the largest degree of 
flexibility of public employers and the highest similarity to private employment pat-
terns in all studied fields of the public sector. The assumptions presented in the ana-
lytical section of this paper have shown to be correct: Competition clearly evokes the 
need to adapt public personnel policies to private sector practices. However, the form 
and breadth of these adaptations are closely linked to the institutional framework of 
public personnel policies and depend on its flexibility. 
Graph 1 exemplifies the different orientations of public personnel policies we 
found. The categorization of personnel policies, i.e. recruitment, initial and continual 
training, patterns of career advancement, and pay systems, as rather career-based or 
position-based (compare section 2) displays the variety of public personnel policies in 
the employment fields and countries. However, the graph also indicates a link between 
career-based personnel policies and rigidity of the institutional embedding on the one 
hand (the police in general, municipal waste collection in France) and between posi-
tion-based policies and flexibility of the institutional embedding on the other hand 
(energy regulatory agencies, municipal waste collection in Germany, Sweden, and the 
UK). 
Our findings show that a functionalist argument helps to explain why personnel 
policies in particular fields of public employment show similarities across countries, 
and why personnel policies differ so much within national public sectors. However, it 
has to be complemented with institutionalist considerations which account for the 
persistence of strong national characteristics of public employment. According to 
functionalist theory, competition for the provision of services in waste collection 
should lead to efforts to decrease wage costs, and competition for qualified personnel 
should trigger wage increases in energy regulatory agencies. This is only partly the case 
though. Instead, public personnel policies react to competition with the private 
economy in ways that comply with the constraints and options created by the national  
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Graph 1: Variance of public personnel policies by employment field and country 
 
institutional embedding of public employment. More precisely, in many cases our 
analysis of personnel policies revealed functional equivalents to wage increases or 
wage cost decreases that were in line with the institutional prerequisites of public em-
ployment. Thus, despite the clear impact of competition for personnel or the provi-
sion of services our case studies mainly indicate institutional compliance of public 
personnel policies. The only apparent divergence can be seen in the case of the 
French energy regulatory agency. This can be attributed to a window of opportunity 
for flexibilisation of personnel policies that was used when the category of independ-
ent administrative authorities was created in the French public sector at the end of the 
1970s. This divergence allowed for the introduction of demand-tailored options for 
continual training in the French energy regulatory agency as a functional equivalent to 
higher salaries. 
As our case studies underline the high relevance of field-specific characteristics of 
public sector employment, future research should take into account the interplay be-
tween national public employment models and personnel policies in particular fields 
of public employment. 
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